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[I... A. No. 25089. In Bank. June 23, 1959.]

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO et aI., Respondents, v .
. . H~SH CALIFORNIA CORPORATION (a Corporation), Defendants; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervener and Appellant.
[la,lb] Parties-Intervention-Right to Intervene.-The United
States was entitled to intervene in an action by plaintiff county
to recover unsecured personal property taxes levied against
defendant's leasehold interest in land leased to defendant for
construction of family dwelling units for military and civilian
personnel designated by the United States under the National
Housing Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 1748-1748h) where, regardless of
whether the outcome of the action would directly and immediately affect the pecuniary interests of the United States
in view of the fact that payments claimed to be in lieu of taxes
had been made, the case directly involved the interest of the
United States in sustaining its fiscal policy by securing an adjudication of the validity and correct interpretation of its
statute, its full participation as a party would assist in securing a judgment that should become definitive of the issues involved in similar situations, and no prejudice to the rights of
either plaintiff or defendant would result from its presence.
[2] Id.-Intervention-Purpoae.-The purposes of intervention are
to protect the interests of those who may be affected by the
jUdgment and to obviate delay and multiplicity of actions, but
intervention may be denied if these objectives are outweighed
by the rights of the original parties to conduct their lawsuit
on their own terms.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San
Bernardino County denying motion by United States for
leave to intervene in an action to recover unsecured personal
property taxes. S. Thomas Bucciarelli, Judge.- Reversed.
Charles K. Rice, Assistant Attorney General, Lee A. Jackf'on and John J. Crown, Department of Justice, Laughlin E.
'Vaters, United States Attorney, Edward R. McHale, Assistant United States Attorney, and Melvin L. LeBow for App(·]Jant.

tll RI'!! Cl'.1.Jur.2d, Parties, § 19 at seq.; Am.Jur., Parties, § 55
I·t seq.
MrK. Dig. References: [IJ Pat·ties, § 18; [2] Parties, § 17.
• Assigned by CbaiJ'UJan of Judicial Council
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Albert E. Weller, County Connscl, and John B. fIRWreDCf',
Drputy County CouDsrl, for R('spondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-The United States of America appeals
from an order denying its motion for leave to intervene in an
action to recover unsecured personal property taxes.
Defendant Harsh is the operator of a Wherry Act Military
Housing Project located on federally owned land at the Marine Corps Supply Center near the town of Barstow. Defendant operates the project under a 75-year lease from the United
States executed pursuant to title VIII of the National Housing Act. (12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1748-1748h.) Under the terms of the
lease, defendant built 337 family dwelling units for occupancy
by those military and civilian personnel designated by the
United States. Title to all improvements and personal property installed therein is ill the United States. The United
States agreed to furnish fire and police protection, if available, and retained the right to regulate the rents charged to
the subtenants.
In 1956, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
Congress had consented to the taxation by local authorities of
a lessee's possessory interest in a Wherry Act housing project.
(Of/utt Housing 00. v. Oounty of Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253 r76
S.Ot. 814, 100 L.Ed. 1151].) Congress then amended the National Housing Act (§ 408 [as amended by § 511, Housing
Act of 1956, ch. 1020, 70 Stat. 1110-1111]) to provide that:
" ..• Nothing contained in the provisions of title VIII of
the National Housing Act in effect prior to August 11, 1955,
or any related provision of law, shall be construed to exempt
from state or local taxes or assessments the interest of a lessee
from the Federal Government in or with respect to any property covered by a mortgage under such provisions of title
VIII; Provided, That, no such taxes or assessments (not paid
or encumbering such property or interest prior to.June 15,
1956) on the interest of such lessee shall exceed the amount
of taxes or assessments on other similar property of similar
value, less such amount as the Secretary of Defense or his
designee determines to be equal to (1) any payments made by
the Federal Government to the local taxing or other public
agencies involved with respe<:t to snch propel·ty, plus (2)
sueh amollut as may be uPPI'oIH'iate Cui' allY expeutlilUl'es
made by the Fedet'al Government or the lessee for the pt'ovision or maintenance of streets, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, sew-
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crs, lighting, SIlOW removal or any other services 01' facilities
which are customarily provided by the State, county, city, or
other local taxing authority with respect to such other similar
ll\·operty. . . . " (42 U.S.C.A. §1594, note.)
The designee of the Secretary of Defense, in accordance
w'ith section 511, supra, determined that Harsh was entitle!1
to a reduction of $27,759 with respect to assessments for the
J957-1958 tax year. The assessor, however, sent Harsh a tax
hill for the full amount of its assessment without any reduction.
The county brought this action to recover taxes and penalties in the amount of $23,099.04. Defendant pleaded that the
designee of the Secretary of Defense had determined that defendant was entitled to a reduction of $27,759 in its taxes, that
notice of this determination had been served on plaintiff's
board of supervisors, and that plaintiff had refused to comply
with this determination.
The United States filed a petition and proposed answer in
intervention. It alleged that it had paid more for facilities
or services normally provided by the local taxing agencies
than the amount of the taxes levied against defendant's possessory interest, that the money so paid was in lieu of taxes,
and that pursuant to federal law the Secretary of Defense
had notified the county board of supervisors of his determination that the local taxes on defendant's possessory interest
must be reduced by $27,759.
Section 387 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"At any time before trial, any person, who has an interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, may intervene in the action
or proceeding.. An intervention takes place when a third person is permitted to become a party to an action or proceeding
between other persons, either by joining the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or by uniting with the
defendant in resisting the claims of the plaintiff, 01' by demanding anything adversely to both the plaintiff and the
defendant. . .. "
The United States contends that the matter 1n litigation
includes the validity and operation of the federal statute, that
it has an interest therein, that it seeks to unite with defendant
in resisting plaintiff's claim, and that it is therefore entitled
to intervene. Plaintiff contends that the interest of the United
Statt's is not" of sueh a direct and immcdiatp c·llarader that"
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the United States" will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect o[ the judgment'· (Elliott v. Superior
Court, 168 Cal. 727, 734 [145 P. 101] ; see also Allen v. California Water & Tel. Co., 31 Cal.2d 104, 109 [187 P.2d 393],
and cases cited), and that leave to intervene was therefore
properly refused. It points out that neither the legal nor
economic incidence of the tax on defendant's possessory interest falls on the United States (see De Luz Homes, Inc. v.
County of San Diego, 45 Ca1.2d 546, 570 [290 P.2d 544]), that
a decision upholding or invalidating the tax will affect tllt'
rents defendant may charge government personnel indirectly
or not at all and therefore even more remotely the United
States, and that the interest of the United States in securing
a favorable precedent is alone not enough to support intervention. (See Jer.~ey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Ca1.2d
661, 664 [91 P.2d 599].)
[1a] It may be conceded that the outcome of plaintiff's
action will not directly affect the federal fisc. The payments
claimed to be in lieu of taxes have been made, if defendant
loses it cannot recoup its tax payments from the United
States (cf. General Dynamics COI·p. v. County of L. A., 51 Cal.
2d 59, 62-63 [330 P.2d 794]), and if it wins it need not reimburse the government for the in lieu payments that extinguished its tax liability. Nevertheless, the United States has
a vital interest in establishing the validity and correct delineation of the fiscal policy set forth by Congress.·
-The purpose of the 1956 amendment to the National Housing Act

wu set forth in the report of the House Committee on Banking and
Currency (H. Rep. No. 2363 on H.B. 11142, 84th Cong., 2d Be8s., pp.
48·49) as follows:
"The need for a claritication of this matter has existed aince the
initiation of the Wherry Act program because of the doubtful validity
and effectiveness of various tax statutes of the States as applied to the
interest of the mortgagor corporations where the projects are loeated
on lands owned by the United States. The problem has involved the
major constitutional question of the right of States to t~x the mort·
gagor's leasehold interest, and has been complicated by the large variety
of statutes in the individnal States which local taxing officials have
attempted to apply to the mortgagor's interests. There hns been a sul,stantial nmount of litigation 011 this matter in State and lower Federal
courts over the period of the program without uniformly resolving the
questions involved. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of tht!
United States in the case of Offutt Rousing Co. 7. County of SMPY (May
211, 19,36), [351 U.S. 253 (76 S.Ct. 814, 100 L.Ed. 1151)]. upheld the
right of local taxing officials in the State of Nebraska to levy certain
State and county • personal property' taxcs against the lessee's interest
in a title VIII project., measured by the full value of the buil,lings and
improvcment.1. However, ns n large portion of the projectM bave Dot
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Congress determined that local taxing agencies should not
secure windfalls by being permitted fully to tax privately held
interestsiu Wherry Act Military Housing Projects when they
wcre also receiving payments from the United States for
services ordinarily rendered to taxpayers or being relieved by I
the United States of the necessity of rendering such services.
It concluded that unless such windfalls were prevented, government payments or services would not reduce taxes and
thereby allowable rents, but result in the housing projects'
carrying more than their share of the expenses of local government. Such windfalls would subvert the purpose of providing housing for government personnel at reasonable rents.
Defendant's resistance to the payment of the tax is based
squarely on the federal statute, and accordingly, this case
directly involves not only defendant's liability to plaintifi,
but the validity and operation of federal fiscal policy defined
by federal statute. The interest of the United States in sustaining its fiscal policy by securing an adjudication of the
validity and correct interpretation of its statute is fully sufficient to support its intervention whether or not the judgment
will directly and immediately affect its pecuniary interests.
(The Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch. (U.S.) 116, 146 [3
L.Ed. 287] ; Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. (U.S.) 478,494-495
[15 L.Ed. 181] ; Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 178179,186 [55 S.Ct. 380, 79 L.Ed. 841, 96 A.L.R. 1166] ; Muench
v. Public Service Com., 261 Wis. 492 [53 N.W.2d 514, 523] ;
Van Riper v. Jenkins, 140 N.J. Eq. 99 [45 A.2d 844, 845, 163
A.L.R. 1343] ; Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444 [185 N.W.
877, 880, 20 A.L.R. 398] ; Jamaica Gaslight Co. v. Nixon, 110
Misc. 494 [181 N.Y.S. 620, 622]; Parker v. State of Indiana, 132 Ind. 419 [31 N.E. 1114] ; see also Securities etc.
Com. v. United States Realty etc. Co., 310 U.S. 434, 460 [60
heeD subject to State and local taxes, payments in lieu of'taxes have
frequently been made to local taxing officials in exchange for usual ser·
"ices, such as schools, furnished to the projects. Also, many expendi·
tures have been made by the }o'ederal Government for streets, utilities,
schools and other services normally furnished by taxing bodies. As tax
payments for a project normally have an ultimate effect on the rentals
)laid by military and civilian personnel at the military installations, it is
important that no payments ue made to "olllrnunities which would con·
"titute a windfall over and ahove normal t:n,,~. Consequently, it is very
important to assure that the project does not duplicate payments tor
services furnished to it. This duplication would be avoided under the
provisions in the bill for deductions from tax payments, as explained
above."
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- -------------.-----S.Ct. 1044, 84 L.Ed. 1293] ; Coleman v. Mille,., 307 U.S. 433,
441-442 [59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385, 122 A.L.R. 69;:;] ; !lopkills Peel. Saeill!Js etc. Assn. Y. C[ml'!I, ~% t'.S. 315, :~;W·:;-H
[56 S.Ct. 235, 80 L.Ed. 251, 100 A.L.R. 1403]; Rocca v.
Tholllpson, 223 U.S. 317, 330 [32 S.Ct. 207, 56 L.Etl. 453] ;
United States v. Minnesota, 279 U.S. 181, 195 [46 S.Ct. 298,
70 L.Ed. 539] ; United States Y. Rickert, 188 r.s. 432, 444 [23
8.Ct. 478, 47 L.Ed. 532] ; Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.,
324 U.S. 439, 450 [65 S.Ct. 716, 89 L.Ed. 1051] ; Iii I'C Debs, 158
U.S. 564, 584-586 [15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092] ; Percy Summcl' Club Y. Astle, 110 F. 486, 489; Gri.ffin Y. 'Ullited Statcs,
168 F.2d 457, 459; United States v. Fitzgemld, 201 F. 295,
296-297 [119 C.C.A. 533J; State of Utah ex reI. Johnson v.
AlcxGllde,', 87 Utah 376 [49 P.2d 408, 415-410]; Estate of
Quinn, 43 Cal.2d 785, 787 [278 P.2d 692] j Koehn v. State
Board of Eqllalizat-ion, 50 Ca1.2d 432, 435-437 [326 P.2d
502] .)
[2] The purposes of intervention are to protect the interests of those who may be affected by the judgment (FLor·ida
v. Georgia, 17 How. (U.S.) 478,494-495 [15 L.Etl. 1811 ; VO!Jce
v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 479, 485 [121 P.2d 536]) and to i
obviate delay and multiplicity of actions (Belt Casualty Co.
v. Furman, 218 Cal. 359, 362 [23 P.2d 293] j Elms v. ELms,
4 Cal.2d 681, 684 [52 P.2d 223, 102 A.L.R. 811]), but intervention may be denied if these objectives are outweighed by
the rights of the original parties to conduct their lawsuit on
their own terms. (See Willett v. Jorclan, 1 Ca1.2d 461, 46;; .
[35 P.2d 1025] j Isaacs v. Jones, 121 Cal. 257, 262 [53 P. 793,
1101].) [lb] In the present case the United States is entitled to be heard to protect its fiscal policy, and its full participation as a party will assist in securing a judgment that
should become definitive of the issues involved in similar
situations. It is making common cause with the defendant,
_and no prejudice to the rights of either plaintiff or defendant will result from its presence. Under these circumstances
its right to intervene is clear.
People v. Brophy, 49 Cal.App.2d 15 [120 P.2d 946], and
Paus v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 134 Cal.App.2d 352 [285 P.2d
1017], are not contrary to our conclusions herein. In the
Brophy case the city of Los Angeles and the aUol'lIey gellel'al
sought to intervene in an a(~tion by a l-i llbs('/'i bel' against the
telepbone company to enjoin discontinuance of service. It
was contended that the contract between the company and
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the subscriber wa:> 111cl;al bCl'ause the televhone was being
useu to communicate racing information. The court held that
the contract was not illegal and that its performance could
not be enjoined and that therefore the city and the attorney
general hau 1\0 interest that could be served by allowing them
to intervene. In the Fans case, the county of Los Angeles
sought to intervene in quiet title actions between the plaintiff
and the city of San Marino involving abandoned railroad
rights of way. The court held that the county's interest in
the city's securing the rights of way for public streets was
"simply consequential and indirect." (134 Ca1.App.2d 352,
359.) The case involved title to real property and was gov('rned, 110t by a county ordinance enacted to promote county
interests, but by applicable state law. In the present case, on
thc (~ol1trary, a federal statute is the heart of the litigation,
and its validity and operation is neces.<;arily directly involved.
The order is reversed. The county shall bear the costs of
this appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and
Peters, J., concurred.
McComb, J., dissented.
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